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Abstract 
 
The growing demand for petrochemical products and the implementation of new process 
technologies have made the petrochemical plants more complex; therefore, it becomes more 
challenging to manage the risk. Traditionally, additional layers of protection were added to prevent 
incidents, which further adds complexity to the existing process. Inherently safer design aims at 
managing the risk from the design stage of petrochemical plants, which eliminates the hazard in 
the process rather than control the risk during operation. When designing a new plant or modifying 
an existing plant, a safety index system will be helpful to assess the risk level of various options 
effectively. This can be achieved by considering the inherently safer design principles, i.e., 
elimination, substitution, moderation, and simplification. In this work, a novel safety index system 
was developed to cover the life cycle of a process design, which includes the research stage, 
process development stage, and engineering design stage. This safety index will be used to 
evaluate the risk level of petrochemical facilities by comparing toxic, flammable, explosive, 
runaway reaction, dust and physical explosion risks and identify the areas where inherently safer 
design principles can be used to improve the process. A case study on ethanol synthesis process 
will be presented for the validation of the index system developed. 
 
1 Introduction 
With a growing population, an increasing number of petrochemical facilities are being built with 
larger capacity and more complexity, which pose a great risk to assets, community and 
environment. As the same time, the general public demands a higher standard for safety 
performance of petrochemical industries. The add-on barriers are traditionally used to manage the 
risk at operation stage, but it has proven to be ineffective and costly. The concept of inherent safe 
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was introduced by Trevor Kletz twenty years ago with the expression of “What You Don't Have 
Can't Leak” [1]. The value of inherently safer design is recognized with time by all stakeholders. 
Recently, the proposed revision of several major process safety regulations mandate inherently 
safer technology in the process design. However, an effective tool is needed to evaluate and 
compare inherent safety of alternative technologies.  
Process safety strategies can be implemented at different stages of the process design life cycle. 
The earlier efforts are made to improve safety, the better the outcome is in terms of safety 
performance and cost. The effectiveness of these strategies needs to be evaluated to ensure a 
desirable safety level and guide the continuous efforts for further improvement. Previous safety 
index systems exist to assess process safety level; however, safety indices that cover all stages of 
process design are limited. This work aims to develop a safety index system for inherently safer 
design through a life cycle approach. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Model framework 
The primary objective here is to develop a safety index system to evaluate risk levels of process 
technologies, aiming to select a safer alternative and identify opportunities for inherently safer 
design. This index system is based on a life cycle approach of process design, including research 
stage, process development stage, and engineering design stage. In each stage this novel index 
system will have different focuses, namely chemical safety, equipment safety and engineer ing 
control measures, as shown in Figure 1. Stage 1 includes analysis of chemical hazards. Stage 2 
considers the failure rates of major equipment. Stage 3 considers the contribution of engineer ing 
safeguards to improve safety. These engineering safeguards can be either passive or active to 
reduce the risk of a potential hazard scenario. Having defined the scope and the approach of the 
index system, the overall framework is presented in Figure 1. It is important to highlight that the 
analysis of safety index can be stopped at any one of the three stages depending on the need of 
required study and available information. The result of stage 1 is a hazard index, because only 
chemical information is considered. From stage 2, the analysis result is a risk index with 
consideration of equipment failure rates.  The only exception of the stage-by-stage approach is the 
reaction risk index, because it covers all three stages if picked for analysis. 
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Figure 1 The framework of the safety index system 
In Stage 1, the chemical compounds are selected to analyze the chemical safety. All the parameters 
necessary for the model calculations of stage 1 will be explained later. Then the incident scenarios 
are generated for the chemicals chosen, together with specified process and release conditions : 
pressure, temperature, leak hole size and quantity of release. The process conditions together with 
the chemical properties are used to generate the hazard index of stage 1. This index carries 
information on the consequence of the chemical release. Different scenarios may be generated 
using different conditions and compared, and alternative processes with different chemical routes 
can be as well compared at this stage for chemical safety. 
For the second stage, the process equipment is included in the analysis by considering the failure 
rates. The combination of failure rate with hazard index from stage 1 allows one to obtain a risk 
index at stage 2. This notion comes from the definition of risk itself where risk is a function of 
both probability and consequence [2]. For this stage, the equipment is selected and combined with 
the release conditions, i.e. hole size, a failure rate is obtained based on the Offshore and Onshore 
Reliability Data (OREDA). A risk matrix is developed to determine the risk index with both hazard 
index from stage 1 and equipment failure rate. 
At stage 3, engineering barriers are considered to control the risk based on the information of 
previous stages, i.e., chemical safety and equipment safety. Each barrier will be applicable 
depending on its nature, to one of the indices. Also, the barriers have an active or passive nature 
and can be categorized between preventive and mitigative. Once the barrier is chosen, the 
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) of the barrier is used for the calculation. For the final 
stage, the probability of risk is obtained by combining the PFDs of safety barriers and equipment 
failure rate. The probability modified was calculated as: 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 [
1
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
] = 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 [
1
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
] ∗ 𝑃𝐹𝐷  
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Following the same procedure, to assess the final risk index from Stage 3, the updated failure 
frequency probability calculated is combined with the hazard index from Stage 1 to obtain a risk 
index according to a matrix system developed in this work.  
2.2 Tool development 
On behalf of user-friendly application, an interactive tool was developed using Microsoft Excel 
Visual Basic for Applications TM. The tool was developed as an attempt to automatize the process 
of preliminary analysis and application of inherently safer design principle to a series of scenarios. 
The tool allows the user to apply the three stages to different scenarios depending on design and 
process specifications. Thus, the objective is to be able to compare and select the inherently safer 
design that is being considered for the analysis. 
The tool was developed using Microsoft Excel 32-bit version, due to the known broad use this 
software has in different industries and levels within the companies. The tool intends to be a user-
friendly and easy-to-understand Excel spreadsheet that uses Macros as the form of interaction with 
the user. Macros are used as the simplification and automation tool within Excel that allows one 
to easily input the parameters needed and select the scenarios 
Therefore, the use of macros will allow the end user to interact with the safety index calculat ions 
throughout the different stages of process design lifecycle, and will also allow a better reporting 
method for the scenarios selected. The purpose of the tool includes but is not limited to the 
automated method of calculation for further comparison of different design scenarios with the goal 
of selecting the inherently safer process. 
As now the tool designed takes into account the individual scenarios. This means that no 
consideration for mixtures or combination of equipment is considered. Each scenario is 
constrained to consider a single chemical, a single equipment, and a single barrier. This does not 
mean that complex processes cannot be analyzed using the tool. Engineering expertise is required 
to compare a complex chemical process by considering all possible scenarios. A node analysis is 
needed to specify the analysis being developed [3]. 
3 Model development 
3.1 Stage 1 
3.1.1 Simulation-based indices: explosivity, flammability, toxicity 
In this section, the method of calculating safety indices at three different stages is explained. As 
previously described, the three initial indices, flammability, explosivity and toxicity, were 
developed using a simulation-based approach. The indices were developed in three steps. First, 
generation of data; second, model generation; and finally, normalization and index generation. 
Generation of data 
In order to accurately represent consequence data for flammable, explosive and toxic scenarios, a 
series of consequence analysis scenarios were generated. The consequence analysis data was 
produced in the form of consequence distance using a commonly used consequence distance 
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modeling software. Using PHAST, simulation of 17 chemicals was conducted to provide results 
to training Neural Network in the second step. The list of chemicals used in PHAST simula t ion 
were selected based on the following criteria: 
 Chemical involved in the incidents provided by the incident database from Sinopec. Also, 
an analysis was performed to compare the incidents from Sinopec and those from the 
United States Chemical Safety Board. 
 Chemicals with their properties cover a full range of various hazards. For example, 
chemicals with NFPA ranking from 1 to 4 in each NFPA category. 
 Chemicals exist in the PHAST database. 
Table 1 shows the number of scenarios generated for each consequence type. 
Table 1 Total number of simulations for each hazard 
Index Number of Scenarios simulated 
Flammability 3,046 
Explosivity  40,800 
Toxicity  3,069 
 
Model generation 
Neural Network models were developed based on the chemical parameters and corresponding 
PHAST consequence results. The neural network models were developed by selecting a series of 
parameters for each index. A parametric analysis was conducted to choose parameters showing a 
strong influence on consequence results of each hazard. 
Figure 2 shows the R value of the training, testing and all data for the fire index. The training, 
validation, and testing data were randomly selected from the PHAST consequence data. 80% of 
the raw data were randomly selected for training. 10% of data were randomly selected for 
validation. The remaining 10% of data were selected for testing. The Bayesian Regulariza t ion 
algorithm has been used and is intended to make sure the results of the training data fit the test and 
validation data.  When R =1, it is a perfect fit. So the R values of 0.988, 0.986, and 0.977 for all 
data for fire, explosion and toxicity are considered good results. 
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Figure 2 Regression results of the neural network simulation of flammability (12.5 
kW/m2) 
Normalization and index generation 
i) Interpolation: The safety indices for toxic release, fire, and explosion are neural network 
models fit to PHAST simulation results. As all models, the neural network models 
developed in this study have limitations. Generally, these models can calculate relative 
safety levels using a number of input parameters; however, there are cases that result in 
negative neural network values since neural network method only provides the best model 
to fit existing data points. Efforts were made to reduce negative results, but it is not able to 
eliminate all negative values in this work. In order to make sense of the index results, 
additional efforts were taken to adjust the negative results using interpolation method. 
The interpolation method uses three parameters from the simulation-based indices. All 
three indices have Pressure and Temperature as main parameters. The third parameter for 
interpolation purposes is IDLH for the toxic index, Heat of Combustion for fire index and 
Flammability Range (UFL-LFL) for explosion index. Pressure and temperature 
information will be adjusted using Table 2 to determine the range of interpolation. Take 
pressure, for example, if the input pressure is 50 psi, the adjusted pressure is 100 psi and 
the pressure range index is 2. Similarly, the temperature range index can be determined. 
Therefore, the interpolation range can be determined if these two range indices are 
combined. After the range is selected, the interpolated result is finally determined by the 
third parameter. Given an input value of the third parameter, the interpolated result will be 
the PHAST result with the closest value to the input of the third parameter. The 
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interpolation method applies only if the neural network models provide invalid values.  
Otherwise, the normal Neural Network results will be used for each index. 
Table 2 Ranges for interpolation for the parameters of Pressure and temperature 
Range Index 
Temperature 
Input [ºC] 
Temperature 
Range [ºC] 
Input Pressure 
[psi] 
Pressure Range 
[psi] 
1 -25 or below -50 1 or below 1 
2 -24-24 0 2-150 100 
3 25-200 100 151-300 200 
4 201-400 300 301-500 400 
5 401-600 500 501-700 600 
6 601 or above 700 701-900 800 
7 
  
901 or above 1000 
 
ii) Normalization: Mapping the consequence results into 0-100 was done using the 
normalization method. This helps to adjust values measured on different scales to a 
common scale. For the flammable, toxic, and explosion hazards, the simulated results range 
on different scales, which is difficult for the users to tell the severity of the consequences 
from the results. Therefore, it is necessary to do the normalization to compare the results 
under same common scale (0-100), wherein 0 indicates least hazardous and 100 indicates 
most hazardous. The following equation is used: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 [0 − 100] =
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑚)
Normalization Factor(𝑚)
∗ 100 
Once the consequence distances were calculated from Neural Network model, a 
normalization factor was needed. The normalization factor needs to take into account the 
distribution of the data for each hazard in order to establish an index system with a 
consistent ranking scale.  
For the simulation-based indices (i.e. flammability, explosivity, and toxicity), the 
normalization factor was taken from the previously filtered data of PHAST simula t ion 
software. Different values were used to see which accounted for the majority of the data. 
Values for 25, 50, 75 and 100 percentiles of consequence distance were used. With a few 
trials, 75 percentile was found to be a reasonable value according to the distribution of the 
data; therefore it was selected as the normalization factor. The 75 percentile values are 600 
m, 2400 m, and 800 m for flammability, toxicity and explosivity, respectively. If the results 
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from Neural Network model is higher than the normalization factor, the index value is 
capped at100.  
3.1.2 Adopted indices: dust explosion, physical explosion, and reaction 
The indices of dust explosion [4], physical explosion [5] and reaction [6] are adopted from 
literature with some modifications to ensure a consistent ranking system.  
3.2 Stage 2 
The Stage 2 of the inherent safety index focuses on various equipment that is commonly used in a 
process plant. The equipment was shortlisted based on operations taking place in the petrochemica l 
industry. The hazard identification included the collection of the failure rates of the equipment to 
analyze. 
A major assumption made for developing risk index for various equipment in Stage 2 relates to 
the release type. Full release, a consistent release at normal operating pressure, is the one selected 
in this study because it fits the desired characteristics and scope of this study. The full release is 
defined as to be consistent with flow through the defined hole, beginning at the normal operating 
pressure, and continuing until controlled by emergency shut-down and blowdown if present and 
operable, or inventory exhaustion.  
3.2.1 Methodology 
The steps followed to calculate the risk index associated with equipment in Stage 2 are: 
a) Various equipment in the process plant were classified into four major classifications : 
mechanical; electrical; bulk transport and movable storage based on the UK HSE HID CI5 
document [7]. These were further sub-classified into vessels; components; pipework; 
pipelines and containers. The details are presented in Table 3. Among different classes of 
equipment, different sub-types were also selected for the analysis. For example, Heat 
Exchanger is an equipment that is used for the physical operation of heating or cooling. 
There were three different types of heat exchanger selected, these include shell and tube, 
plate and air-cooled heat exchanger. Different types were also considered for other 
equipment wherever possible. 
b) Five different hole sizes are considered for risk index determinations. These hole sizes are 
25 mm, 50 mm, 500 mm, 750 mm, 1000 mm. The above hole sizes were selected to 
represent a range of scenarios from small, medium to large releases. 
c) The next step is to assign the right failure frequencies of equipment and these depend on 
two main parameters: Hole Size and Release Size. The dependencies of failure rate on 
various equipment are shown in Table 3. 
d) Based on the step above, failure rate frequencies are assigned to various scenarios using 
the OGP failure rate database [8].  
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Table 3 Dependency of failure rate for various equipment 
Type of Equipment Sub-classification Dependency of failure rate  
Physical Operations 
Heat Exchanger Shell and tube Hole Diameter, Release size 
 Plate heat exchanger Hole Diameter, Release size 
 Air-cooled Hole Diameter, Release size 
Pipes Fixed pipe network Hole Diameter, pipe length 
Pumps Centrifugal pump Hole Diameter, Release Size 
 Reciprocating Hole Diameter, Release Size 
Compressor  Centrifugal Hole Diameter, Release Size 
Pressure Vessels Large vessels Release Size 
Small and medium 
atmospheric tanks 
Flammable content  Release Size 
Chemical Operations 
Reactors  General Hole Diameter, type of release 
   
 Non-Flammable content Release Size 
Utilities 
Boilers  Release Size 
 
3.2.2 Index determination 
Since the index of runaway reaction risk is a risk index, five sub-indices are combined with 
equipment failure rate to generate the risk indices, including fire; explosion; toxic release; dust 
explosion and physical explosion. This makes use of the risk matrix shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Risk matrix for stage 2 
3.3 Stage 3 
The stage 3 of the safety index focuses on various safety controls or barriers that are commonly 
used in a process plant. These controls or barriers aid in reducing the probability of occurrence of 
process safety events and/or reducing the severity of the consequences. For the evaluation of risk 
index in Stage 3, the safety controls or barriers were shortlisted based on various process operations 
in petrochemical industry and experts’ opinions. It is important to note that this list is a sample list 
and can be improved continuously by adding safeguards. The user may add more controls while 
carrying out the assessment based on the case study at hand.  
3.3.1 Methodology 
The steps followed as part of this methodology for evaluation of the Stage 3 index are: (i) list all 
the possible engineering controls in a process plant; (ii) classify the controls as active or passive 
controls; (iii) categorize the controls as preventive or mitigative controls based on the purpose, i.e., 
whether the control/barrier is effective in reducing consequence or frequency; (iv) assign 
probability of failure on demand (PFD) value to each listed control (various sources e.g., CCPS; 
OREDA database; IEC 61511); (v) calculate final sub-index value using the PFD mean value, after 
incorporating the barrier for risk reduction. This has been presented below as a flowchart in Figure 
4. 
Extensive impact 100 60 65 70 80 100
Major impact 75 25 36 50 75 80
Medium impact 50 12 30 40 50 70
Minor impact 25 8 16 30 36 50
No impact 0 4 8 12 16 20
1.00E-10 1.00E-08 1.00E-06 1.00E-04 1.00E-02
Highly unlikely Unlikely Possible Likely Very likely
Failure frequency (1/yr)
Consequence
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Figure 4 Stage 3 methodology 
3.3.2 Index determination 
For the incorporation of the impact of these controls to the final risk assessment, a method similar 
to Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is followed. The failure probability values from Stage 2 
are multiplied by the PFD of the selected controls or safeguards for the particular scenario to obtain 
the updated failure probability for Stage 3. Finally, a risk matrix was used to determine the risk 
index as shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 Risk matrix for stage 3 
4 Case study  
The case study aims to demonstrate the use of index system to identify a safer process and assist 
with the decision making. In the case study, two processes producing ethylene are selected: one is 
catalytic dehydration of bio-ethanol and the other is oxydehydrogenation of ethane [9].   
Process 1 - Catalytic dehydration of bio-ethanol 
The process of converting bio-ethanol to ethylene is shown in the Figure 6. The first step is to 
preheat the ethanol, which is then converted to the main product, ethylene, by the endothermic 
dehydration of ethanol. Since the reactor output contains some impurities, it must be subjected to 
a downstream purification step. Purification steps include water washing, caustic washing, 
absorption and drying to obtain the desired chemical grade ethylene. There are different kinds of 
design to complete the process. In this case study, the design of Petrobras, as shown in Figure 7 is 
chosen. 
 
Figure 6 Conversion of bio-ethanol to ethylene via dehydration [9] 
Extensive impact 100 60 65 70 80 100
Major impact 75 25 36 50 75 80
Medium impact 50 12 30 40 50 70
Minor impact 25 8 16 30 36 50
No impact 0 4 8 12 16 20
1.00E-20 1.00E-16 1.00E-12 1.00E-08 1.00E-04
Highly unlikely Unlikely Possible Likely Very likely
Failure frequency (1/yr) (incorporating PFD)
Consequence
GCPS 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________   
 
Figure 7 Simplified flow diagram of the Petrobras dehydration process [9] 
Process 2 - Oxydehydrogenation of ethane 
Figure 8 shows the process flow diagram designed by Union Carbide with its key conversion and 
separation steps. Figure 9 depicts the simplified flow diagram of the Union Carbide. 
 
Figure 8 Block diagram of ethane to ethylene via oxydehydrogenation [9] 
 
Figure 9 A simplified flow diagram adapted from the Union Carbide 
oxydehydrogenation process [9] 
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During this process, the ethane and oxygen feedstock supplied by the air separation unit are 
compressed, mixed and preheated before entering the reactor. The oxydehydrogenation reaction 
takes place in a series of three reactors in which ethane is introduced into the first reactor and 
oxygen is supplied in parallel (to each reactor inlet). At each reactor, the feed stream was preheated 
to about 250 °C and converted to ethylene in a free radical reaction at 300-400 °C. 
The reacted product stream comprises ethylene, acetic acid, water, unreacted ethane, unreacted 
oxygen, gases produced by side reactions such as carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, and other 
gases present in commercial ethane. The scrubber separates the remaining aqueous acetic acid and 
then the gas from the scrubber removes the carbon dioxide through the amine adsorption system. 
Next, the gas stream is compressed and introduced into the distillation column. The top product of 
the distillation is ethylene, with ethane and other gases in the bottom. Ethane from the distilla t ion 
column is recycled back to the reaction system. 
The chemicals involved in these two processes are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 Substances involved in the two processes 
Pathway Dehydration process Oxydehydrogenation 
process 
Raw material  Ethanol Ethane 
Main reaction 2CH3CH2OH→H2C=CH2 + 2H2O 
+CH3CHO (by-product) 
CH3CH3 +1/2O2 → H2C=CH2 
+H2O 
Desired product Ethylene  Ethylene  
Main by-product Ethanol Ethane, O2 
Other by-product Acetaldehyde and Acetic acid Acetic acid 
Other by-products or 
gases 
 CO and CO2 
 
Given the chemicals and equipment involved in the two processes, the indices of flammability, 
toxicity and explosivity are selected for the analysis. The study includes major chemica ls, 
equipment and fire detection as the control barriers. The result shows that the dehydration process 
is safer than oxydehydrogenation process in terms of flammability and explosivity indices, but not 
the toxicity index. Overall, the oxydehydrogenation process is safer.  
5 Conclusions 
In this work, a novel safety index system was developed to cover the life cycle of a process design, 
which includes research stage, process development stage, and engineering design stage. This 
safety index can be used to evaluate the risk level of petrochemical facilities by comparing toxic, 
flammable, explosive, runaway, dust and physical explosion risks and identify the areas where 
inherently safer design principles can be used to improve the process. A case study on ethanol 
synthesis process was conducted for the validation of the index system developed. 
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